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FROM CYNICISM TO POSITIVE THEORY
IN PUBLIC CHOICE
Saul Levmoret
INTRODUCrION
Public choice theory need not be either threatening or depress-
ing, but academics can make it so. It is not, to be sure, a field that
imparts good news wherever it grows. It offers incoherent majorities,
aggregation impossibilities, and most famously-though perhaps un-
fortunately-self-serving, overachieving interest groups that are busy
imposing external costs on less-organized citizens and generating
rent-seeking costs in many subtle ways. This is the stuff of public
choice.
It is easy to dip into the public choice literature and emerge only
with distressing normative conclusions about that which emanates
from legislatures, large electorates, bureaucracies, and even judiciar-
ies. But public choice also yields insights about legal and political in-
stitutions and about precommitments that social groups make to
avoid these problems. Public choice theory, as applied to legal institu-
tions and rules, can be the study of how we do the best we can in the
face of difficulties. It is also about sensible selection among rules and
decisionmaking processes. It is, for example, about the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, which describes the power of groups to reach better
decisions than individuals, and suggests why we ought sometimes to
be pleased to be on the losing end of a vote.1 Quite generally, in the
hands of positive, optimistic handlers, public choice theory is a means
of understanding the genius, or at least the staying power, of many of
our political, legal, and constitutional institutions.2
t Dean and William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1 The idea is that a large number of observers will do better than any non-expert
individuals, so that it is comforting to be part of a group because the group can correct the
misimpressions of the individuals. Thus, few of us would want to serve as a jury of one
entrusted to convict or acquit a defendant of a serious criminal charge. But if we can work
with a number of fellow jurors, we might feel quite comfortable even with a decision that
falls somewhat short of unanimity.
2 1 am mindful of the criticism that any such move is likely to make selective use of
the tools of public choice. See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality orPublic Choice
and the Perils of Occam'sRazor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 109 (2000). I would say that critics of
public choice as applied to law and other matters are often equally selective in their appeal
to rationality assumptions and the like. Most progressive critics adore a good prisoner's
dilemma, for instance, and yet this model makes little sense unless one buys into a set of
razor-like assumptions. For further discussion, see Saul Levmore, The Public Choice Threat,
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Even when interest group activity is concerned, it is possible to
see legal rules as reflecting attempts to harness that which is good
about interest groups and to minimize the rent-seeking and other
damage that well-organized groups can inflict. That is something this
Symposium might have explored but did not. My easy task is to say
that it could be done, without doing it here. Public choice need not
be depressing (and, therefore, perhaps greeted with hostility). The
positive, optimistic version of public choice begins with an under-
standing of public choice as about much more than the reality, or
threat, of interest group power. In any event, public choice is a seri-
ous field with serious implications for positive and normative theo-
rizing about law.
I
PHENOMENOLOGY AND MAJORiTy RuLE
In some sense, and despite the tide of the Symposium which this
Comment grows out of, the Articles I comment on here by Professor
Edward Rubin 3 and Professor Jonathan Macey,4 are not about public
choice and are not much informed by it. The Rubin paper, Public
Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modem State,5 aims to re-
mind us at every turn that a variety of experiences and influences give
meaning to things. But this is mostly orthogonal to public choice.
Public choice does not, or at least need not, claim to be the only game
in town; it simply follows the common pattern found in the social sci-
ences and sciences of making simplifying assumptions-beginning in
this case with rational political actors. To criticize public choice by
reminding us of the varied ways in which people give meaning to insti-
tutions and other things, is a bit like criticizing the link between to-
bacco consumption and health problems by pointing to an
acquaintance who has lived a long and untroubled life despite regular
tobacco use. Public choice might explain or inform a good many
things, even as there are matters better explained or even only ex-
plained with some other tool, including the phenomenological
approach.
In any event, I have no quarrel with the idea of explaining some
things, or of giving them content, by considering the meaning given
by those who experience the things in question. It is perhaps ironic
67 U. CHi. L. REv. 941 (2000). But Professor Farina's point about the selective use of tools,
Farina, supra at 135, is a deep one and requires more than a footnote or comment in
response.
3 Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenolog, and the Meaning of the Modern State:
Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 309 (2002).
4 Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 280 (2002).
5 Rubin, supra note 3.
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that these meanings may be given individually or collectively, and self-
consciously or unwittingly, but no advocate of public choice theory
need be threatened by any of these sources or explanations. Indeed,
these resemble public choice theories in their mixing of individual
and collective considerations and in their seamless combination of
claims about human behavior that are hard to understand in evolu-
tionary terms with claims or intuitions that are more easily seen as
consciously or politically developed.6
Consider some examples of self-reflective meaning that are drawn
from the stuff of collective choice. A group may vote on a question
with a right answer, as when a jury votes to convict or acquit. Simi-
larly, a court or an electorate may be asked to pass on an experimental
plan involving school vouchers. In the first example, the group's
judgment may itself give meaning to jury decisionmaking or, for that
matter, to criminal law itself. And in the second example, the court or
electorate's action, not to mention the manner in which it reaches its
decision, may define the voucher plan (or at least its message) and
even the nature of education. How we do things, and how we think
we do them, can obviously affect the things themselves, although the
importance of these derived meanings is another question.
I do not mean any of this to be controversial or disagreeable, but
it may be worth pausing to say something positive on behalf of public
choice. By sliding quickly into the language and nature of meaning,
there is the danger that we miss some of what is intriguing about a
process. In the case of public choice, and especially for an audience
that is trained to see public choice as a source of cynicism (because of
the fixation legal academics suffer regarding overachieving interest
groups), there is the danger that the audience will see rational-actor
analysis as useless. This is because few people describe their own ac-
tions in these terms, if only because the very act of participation in
politics may seem irrational-or simply may seem to be the source of
the cynicism. In the case of intellectuals, it is also because they. enjoy
pointing to paradoxes that are most easily dealt with by concluding
that the rational-actor assumption is wrongheaded. 7 In fact, much of
6 Thus, a phenomenologically inclined observer will sometimes point to meanings
that people themselves attach to things (as in Professor Rubin's observation that people say
they expect government to solve their problems, Rubin, supra note 3, at 347-48, but some-
times draw attention to meanings that might be subconsciously held and that we might not
have perceived had they not been pointed out (as in Rubin's intriguing suggestion that
government is a structure of meaning which citizens share intersubjectively, see id. at
346-47).
7 Compare Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 895 (2000)
(discussing the paradox of voter participation where there is no legal sanction and no
plausible chance of affecting the outcome with a single vote), with Levmore, supra note 2
(suggesting that the puzzle of voter participation is an unwise starting point for thinking
about public choice).
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the charm of public choice lies in its ability to find good news, or at
least interesting news, despite a simplifying assumption of selfishness.
Much as microeconomic theory is able to produce some optimism, in
the form of efficiency claims, out of a world of selfish, rational actors,
public choice theory is also able to see a bright side after making simi-
lar assumptions of selfishness and rationality about voters, elected offi-
cials, and appointed citizens.
Knowledgeable readers will know that I have already begun one
illustration and that it draws on the CondorcetJury Theorem.8 Even
if individuals are completely self-regarding, a group of individuals,
each of whom is only barely likely to be right about something, may by
majority vote reach stunningly accurate conclusions. One way to
think about legal systems is to ask whether majority rule is deployed
when the optimism about majority decisionmaking is well-founded be-
cause the CondorcetJury Theorem's assumptions are plausible. If so,
then we should be quite impressed that many constitutions and much
spontaneous law can achieve good results even when individuals are
entirely self-regarding, strategic, and so forth.
A more sophisticated, but similarly optimistic, claim might be
that a clever thing about majority rule (and some jury verdicts and
popular voting rules) is that it offers no incentive for dissembling. If a
member of ajury sees that the group is poised to offer a plaintiff $x in
damages, but this juror individually thinks that $3x is correct or pref-
erable, the juror gains nothing (or at least is unlikely to gain any-
thing) by voting against the majority or against the plaintiff
altogether. Destructive strategic behavior, in the sense of behavior
that might generate perverse results, may well be minimized by many
of our legal rules and voting practices.
This is an occasion to suggest rather than to advance these claims.
I mean only to point out that plausible, useful theories, built on public
choice foundations, have little to do with attached and derived mean-
ings. Very few jurors or voters know the first thing about one jury
theorem or another, and yet they may in combined fashion do impor-
tant work without realizing why their services are more valuable in
some circumstances than in others. Similarly, those who draft consti-
tutions, design voting systems for popular elections, fashion different
voting rules for legislative assemblies, or construct rules for decision-
making on judicial panels, and certainly those who live by these deci-
sionmaking rules, may not always appreciate their subtle features.
8 For some background and further applications, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 158-59 (1996); Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates, and Democ-
racy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the CondorcetJury Theorem, in INFORMATION POOLING
AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 173, 175-77 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds.,
1986).
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Even better, when we abide by norms as to how and when to vote in
our daily affairs, most of us are unaware of the elegant, public choice
"explanations" that might fit our practices.
The meanings that we might give to constitutions and voting
practices should not steer us completely away from exploring the sub-
tler and sometimes more heroic features of these institutions. As is
probably apparent, I like an approach to law that searches for optimis-
tic explanations about why we do things as we do, even when the
evolution of these practices is a bit mysterious. I do not claim to un-
derstand how framers stumble upon rules that discourage strategic
voting, or how groups know to choose among plurality voting, major-
ity voting, and supermajority voting, and even markets in the very way
that a public choice theorist might have suggested (but did not). But
of course theories of meaning are also not known for their evolution-
ary stories.
II
PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM IN PUBLIC CHOICE
I might take the same approach to the Macey Article, Cynicism
and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory.9 It focuses more on inter-
est groups than on voting, and on agency problems rather than on the
ways in which legal and political institutions might anticipate or gen-
erate these problems. It is about public choice only in the sense that we
think of interest groups as important examples of collective action (or
not, as the case may be). I think we can find optimistic things to say
about interest groups and the ways in which our legal institutions han-
dle them, not to mention Macey's politicians and bureaucrats. But
there is no need to rehearse this cheery view.
In an unkind but consistent moment, Professor Macey might re-
act to my optimistic injections-including the idea that majority rule
is selectively and cleverly employed, or that our rules combat strategic
behavior-with the observation that I take this sort of approach be-
cause it advances my career to do so. If political actors are elegantly
(in the sense of simple theorizing) understood to be selfish, then why
not academic ones as well? Meanwhile, Professor Rubin might say
that my impressions and tastes give meaning to my existence and to
my feelings. These are serious points, although they will seem prepos-
terous to many readers if only because there is no end to this sort of
thinking. Macey's own idea may be best understood through some
single-variable unattractive behavioral norm, and the meanings we
give to Rubin's meanings send us down another spiraling path. I do
not pursue these matters here, because the task at hand is to comment
9 Macey, supra note 4.
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not on my own relatively optimistic views but rather on those in the
main papers. In this context it bears noting that each paper, while by
its terms applying to public choice theory, could apply just as well to
academic theories, to scientific theories, and to most social science
research.
III
THE CONSCIOUS (AND OTHER) MEANINGS WE ATrACH
What should we make of Rubin's idea that a government is a
structure of meaning which citizens share intersubjectively? 10 Rubin is
obviously correct when he observes that most people look to govern-
ment to solve their problems, and so it is fair to say that when they
give meaning to government and to its laws, the meaning itself builds
on this conception of what government is expected to accomplish.11
But of course we might ask people whether they think that govern-
ments really do solve their problems, and put this way it is not entirely
clear that what people think an institution ought to do reveals much
about the meaning they give the institution. People might think that
an army ought to defend them and bring peace, but their experiences
with the horror of warfare or with large investments in standing peace-
time armies might cause them to give a very different meaning to ar-
mies and military service. 12
Moreover, there are many things that people want that are incon-
sistent with Rubin's implicit conclusion, that we be sympathetic to pro-
gressive politics because most people look to government to solve
their problems. Thus, most people want tax cuts and most people do
not want the government interfering in their own private lives. Most
people may prefer capital punishment and decry foreign aid. Politi-
cians do, after all, have some incentive to give people what they think
they want, so that it is unclear where the structure of meaning will
take us.
In all these cases, framing is terribly important. Most people look
to government to solve their problems even as they might look to indi-
vidual inspiration or entrepreneurial skill (in a deregulated environ-
ment) to solve the same problems. All of us know of the literature on
framing effects, 13 and we could have anticipated the importance of
10 See Rubin, supra note 3, at 346-47.
11 See id. at 347-48.
12 The new meaning need not be cynical or skeptical. People might have thought
that their army ought to bring peace, but they might come to attach new meanings in the
form of believing that the army successfully advanced the cause of social equality or pro-
moted a full employment economy.
13 See, e.g., JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics,
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Con-
structs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637 (1998).
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framing in ascertaining "what people wane' and what meanings they
give to governments. I find it counterproductive or even a bit mislead-
ing, therefore, for Professor Rubin to appeal so regularly in his work
to the observation that people seek meaning and governmental solu-
tions to the problems around them.14 These same people seek many
things that are not so convenient to a phenomenological view, and
readers would feel in safer hands if guided through this morass of
conflicting wants and meanings. Instead, the article adopts a kind of
debater's perspective, scoring points with the selective use of illustra-
tions. "Transcedental" phenomenology may be an intriguing notion
and I think it can be a useful one as well. 15 But it is more useful if it
confronts our uncertainties and confusion, and it is less useful when it
is used immediately to serve an ideological rather than methodologi-
cal purpose.
Indeed, the phenomenological approach, with more balanced ex-
amples of conflicting meanings and attachments, might mount a seri-
ous challenge to public choice. A centerpiece of public choice is the
idea that while an individual is assumed to be coherent and rational, a
collective of individuals may well be incoherent as it aggregates its
preferences. (Note that I have moved away from group decisionmak-
ing where there is a hunt for the correct answer. The present refer-
ence is to the famous problem of aggregating preferences, as opposed
to attempts at discovering a right answer.) But a balanced phenome-
nological approach, as I have already suggested, raises the possibility
that even a single individual may be conflicted and incoherent, after a
fashion. Individual X may want the government to solve problems-
but X may also want it to cut taxes and leave people alone, and so
forth. This conflict among sentiments may itself give meaning to gov-
ernment, but for the moment the point is simply that the conflict is
contrary to a basic assumption of the public choice literature. Rubin's
observation might have been that the phenomenological approach
suggests that public choice theory begins with untenable assumptions
about rational actors. In particular, if these actors are individually un-
able to rank preferences and to stick to those rankings, then the en-
tire literature arising out of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem' 6 will be
much less important. More realistically, that part of public choice the-
ory might need to add some initial conditions regarding the scope of
the incoherence problem.' 7
14 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 3, at 328-29, 332-34, 337, 345-46.
15 See id. at 350.
16 KENNTH J. ARRoW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDMDUAL VALUES (1951).
17 Voting paradoxes might also seem less important in a world in which individuals
were often thought of as inconsistent or incoherent in their preference orderings. Why
get upset about paradoxes that are created by groups just because the individual members
happen to be consistent with respect to this matter, but not many others?
2002]
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IV
FROM RAZORS TO BRUSHES
The Macey and Rubin Articles exhibit dramatically different
tastes in theory. Macey pursues elegance, in the sense of capitalizing
on as few variables as possible, which is to say one-hence, the razor
metaphor with which it engages the reader. The Macey piece is also
self-conscious about the predictive power of theory and the value (and
threat) of disconfirmation through empirical evidence and, perhaps,
new theoretical insights. In contrast, the Rubin article reflects a taste
for richness and indeterminacy, and it sets out a perspective or theory
that is not subject to disconfirmation-or perhaps even to confirming
evidence. Macey would enjoy predicting government reactions to vari-
ous phenomena; Rubin might think such an exercise quite beside the
point, at least with respect to phenomenology.
But it should be noted that even Macey is not offering a predic-
tive theory. What, after all, does it mean to be the "most cynical expla-
nation" of government action or inaction?18 We might observe a
polity going to war, experimenting with school vouchers, or delivering
health care in a particular manner. Cynicism might mean that in each
case, we should look for a payoff to critical politicians. We should not
imagine that a politician cares about the nation or about fairness or
efficiency. Of course, the politician might be self-interested and care
about his or her own reputation. Alternatively, we might be cynical
about each voter, and then think of the government as the product of
a difficult, collective attempt to design a system that minimized agency
costs. Politicians are then just one piece of the larger cynical picture.
None of these steps takes us very far, and perhaps that is why I find
myself preferring that part of positive political theory that deals with
such things as majority (and other) voting rules.
Even here, in these corners of public choice and the law, I do not
claim to escape the extensive reach of our two authors. Macey might
cynically say that when law or politics allows juries or voters to decide
things, it is not because of the genius of majority rule but rather be-
cause powerful interests or agents are deflecting decisionmaking so as
not be blamed. Strictly speaking, this does no damage to the Condor-
cetJury Theorem approach, but it should give some pause and it sug-
gests an interesting approach to predicting when we use various
voting rules. But that is not an idea I will pursue here.
Somewhat similarly, I have begun to hear Rubin's voice every-
where I go. What I think of as the ingenious, if mysterious, selection
among voting rules, for example, can be understood through the idea
that voting and deliberation enhance meaning and facilitate shared
18 Macey, supra note 4, at 283.
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meaning. Disparate voting rules might reflect different expectations
about the meanings attached to various decisions. But I leave this pro-
ject for those more enamored with the phenomenological approach.
Positive political theory may attract them, albeit for different reasons
than it has attracted those who are more comfortable with explora-
tions that embark from the rational actor starting point.
CONCLUSION
If the implicit agenda of this Symposium is the question of what
useful insights public choice might offer to administrative law, then it
naturally draws our attention to such matters as markets versus politi-
cal determinations, the value of a human life for cost-benefit and reg-
ulatory purposes, and so forth. These are the questions with which
modem administrative lawyers must wrestle, and theory builders will
be more valued the more they can help with these questions. Put this
way, I do not see how either the Macey Article or the Rubin Article will
help us very much. These are thoughtful rather than helpful articles.
Their authors share a talent for producing provocative works, reflec-
tive of world views that are themselves clear and provocative, and they
engage readers, or at least this reader, who will want to ask more ques-
tions before concluding that some theories are simply interesting
rather than functional. But as for public choice and what it might
offer to administrative law, I like to think that public choice offers
suggestions of how and when groups will benefit by working toward
decent solutions to hard problems. I also like to think that Professors
Macey and Rubin will agree with this aim and that in future work they
will address this common cause through the lenses they crafted here
or, more likely, with different tools.
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